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PLAYING BY THE RULES: DUE PROCESS AND
ERRORS OF STATE PROCEDURAL LAW
MARTHA I. MORGAN*
The Supreme Court has generally been unreceptive to claims that vio-
lations of state law constitute federal constitutional violations. Rather,
the Court has repeatedly stated that "a 'mere error of state law' is not a
denial of due process."1 Specifically, the Court has failed to acknowledge
that due process requires compliance with duly established state proce-
dural safeguards before government may deprive a person of life, liberty,
or property.
A striking example of the Court's failure to elevate violations of estab-
lished state procedural safeguards to a violation of due process is found
in Barclay v. Florida.2 In Barclay, the Court upheld a death sentence
admittedly imposed in violation of state law.3 The state trial judge had
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1. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 731 (1948), quoted in Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418,
3425 n.8 (1983) (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, J.).
2. 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
3. The Court voted six to three to afirm the death sentence. The Chief Justice and Justices
White and O'Connor joined Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion. Justice Stevens concurred in the
judgment in an opinion which Justice Powell joined. Justices Marshall and Blackmun wrote dissent-
ing opinions, with Justice Brennan joining Justice Marshall's opinion.
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rejected a jury's advisory sentence of life imprisonment and sentenced the
defendant to death,4 relying in part upon the defendant's criminal record,
a factor which was not a proper aggravating circumstance under Florida
law. In the plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist declared that the federal
Constitution did not prohibit consideration of the defendant's criminal
record' and emphasized that "'mere errors of state law' are not the con-
cern of this Court, . . . unless they rise for some other reason to the
level of a denial of rights protected by the United States Constitution."
6
In dissenting opinions, Justices Marshall and Blackmun offered different
approaches to the question whether errors of state law are constitution-
ally significant. Justice Marshall relied on due process "entitlement"
analysis. Justice Marshall argued that Florida's prohibition on consider-
ation of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances constituted a "state-
created protection" that "cannot be arbitrarily abrogated . . . without
violating the Constitution."7 Justice Blackmun, in a brief dissent, ap-
proached the errors of state law issue more directly, arguing that the
state had failed to follow "the rule of law." 8
The first section of this Article examines the foundations and support
for the respective approaches of Justices Rehnquist, Marshall, and Black-
mun in the Barclay case.9 The second part of this Article argues that due
process requires compliance with established procedural safeguards when
a government seeks to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property."t
This Article proposes a "fair play" approach to defining due process that
builds upon Justice Blackmun's "rule of law" approach in Barclay. This
approach recognizes that procedural "unfairness" may occur in two
ways. First, the procedural rules themselves may be unfair. 1 Second,
the government's disregard of established procedural safeguards also is
unfair. This second variety of unfairness exists regardless of whether the
4. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921. 141 (1973). See also Mikenas v. State 367 So. 2d 606, 610 (Fla.
1978). (construing aggravating circumstances).
5. 103 S. Ct. at 3427 (1983) (plurality opinion).
6. Id. at 3428.
7. Id. at 3443 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 3445 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. See infra notes 12-119 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens' opinion concurring in the
judgment did not address the constitutional significance of the state law error apart from a general
evaluation of the adequacy of the Florida scheme under eighth amendment standards.
10. See infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
11. The Court's normative due process inquiry into the minimum procedural requisites of fun-
damental fairness, typically described as a determination of "what processes is due," reflects this first
notion of fairness.
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Constitution would otherwise require that the particular safeguard be
provided. The fair play interpretation, therefore, posits that both unfair
rules and failure to play by established rules violate due process.
The first concept of fairness, that of minimally fair procedures, is
firmly embedded in the Court's interpretation of due process. The sec-
ond concept of fairness, that of "playing by the rules," however, has
failed to gain the Court's full approval. This Article argues that fairness
under the due process clauses includes "playing by the rules." The fair
play approach is consistent with the text of the due process clauses and
with common notions of fairness. It also is consistent with a proper un-
derstanding of the "rule of law," which underlies the due process clauses.
Implicit in the "rule of law" concept is a separation between the process
of rule formulation and the processes of rule interpretation and applica-
tion. "Due separation of processes" requires that governments comply
with their own duly established procedural safeguards unless they repeal
or modify these rules through duly established legislative, administrative,
or judicial processes. Government's ad hoc refusal to apply existing pro-
cedural rules violates due process. "Due separation of processes" differs
from the doctrine of separation of powers that governs the allocation of
powers among the three branches of the federal government. "Due sepa-
ration of processes" applies to federal and state governments alike and
poses limits within and not just between branches of government. The
final section of this Article discusses some effects the fair play approach
would have upon traditional notions of federalism.
I. THREE APPROACHES TO THE DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF
STATE PROCEDURAL RULE VIOLATIONS
A. The "'Mere Error" Approach
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Barclay rejected the argument
that the trial judge's consideration of the defendant's criminal record as
an aggravating circumstance offended due process because it violated
state law. He characterized Barclay's brief as "suggest[ing] that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court failed to properly apply its own cases in upholding
petitioner's death sentence." Justice Rehnquist responded to this charac-
terization by stating that "mere errors of state law are not the concern of
this Court . . . unless they rise for some other reason to the level of a
denial of rights protected by the United States Constitution." 2 Treating
12. 103 S. Ct. at 3428.
FAIR PLAY
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the constitutional issue as a question of eighth amendment standards,
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the Constitution did not prohibit the
judge from considering the defendant's criminal record when imposing
the death penalty. 13 He described the "crux of the issue" as "whether
the trial judge's consideration of this improper aggravating circumstance
so infects the balancing process created by the Florida statute that it is
constitutionally impermissible for the Florida Supreme Court let [sic] the
sentence stand."" * Justice Rehnquist gave the erroneous impression that
the Florida Supreme Court had ruled that eliminating the improper ag-
gravating circumstance could not possibly have affected the balance
struck by the trial judge. He concluded that the trial court's reliance
upon a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance did not unconstitutionally
infect Florida's balancing process.15
A majority of the Court followed the Barclay plurality's approach in
Wainwright v. Goode.16 The Court held that Goode's sentence should
stand even if the sentencing judge had violated state law by considering
the defendant's future dangerousness when imposing the death penalty.
The per curiam opinion in Goode relied heavily on Justice Rehnquist's
Barclay opinion, quoting both his "mere errors of state law" statement
and his eighth amendment "infection" standard.17 Seven of the Justices
agreed that because the Florida Supreme Court had independently
13. Id. at 3427 (1983) (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist distinguished Zant v. Stephens,
103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983). In Stephens, the Georgia Supreme Court held that one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances relied upon was unconstitutionally vague under the federal due process
clause but nevertheless upheld Stephens' death sentence. The United States Supreme Court refused
to vacate the sentence. Justice Rehnquist's discussion in Barclay implied that Stephens rested upon a
finding of constitutional error coupled with an application of federal harmless error analysis. 103 S.
Ct. at 3425 n.8.
14. 103 S. Ct. at 3427-28.
15. Id. at 3428. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the Florida Supreme
Court had not applied state harmless error analysis in Barclay. Indeed, the Florida court had
praised the trial judge's performance when the case first came before the court. Id. at 3441 (quoting
Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1271 n.8 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978)). The
Florida Supreme Court later vacated this judgment sua sponte after the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), and remanded for resentencing to give
Barclay a full opportunity to rebut information contained in the presentence report provided to the
trial judge. On remand the trial judge resentenced Barclay to death relying upon the same aggravat-
ing factors. The Florida Supreme Court again affirmed. The court refused to consider Barclay's
challenges to the aggravating factors relied upon by the sentencing judge in the reimposition of the
death sentence because his arguments were "against the finding previously reviewed here and af-
firmed." Barclay v. State, 411 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981).
16. 104 S. Ct. 378 (1983) (per curiam).
17. Id. at 383.
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reweighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the death sen-
tence did not violate the eighth amendment."8 Only Justices Brennan
and Marshall dissented. 9
Justice Rehnquist relied upon Engle v. Isaac2 ° to support his plurality
opinion in Barclay. In Isaac, the Court reversed three Sixth Circuit judg-
ments granting writs of habeas corpus based on challenges to jury in-
structions regarding self-defense.2' Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court emphasized that state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief must
allege a deprivation of federal rights.22 The Court concluded that one of
the claims raised in Isaac "[did] no more than suggest that the instruc-
tions. . . may have violated state law,"23 and thus did not raise a colora-
ble constitutional claim.24 The Court noted that "we have long
recognized that a 'mere error of state law' is not a denial of due
18. Id.
19. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reiterated his view that the death penalty
violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments and objected to the Court's "growing and disturbing
trend toward summary disposition of cases involving capital punishment." Id. In the dissent's view,
the Court should have remanded for consideration in light of Barclay. Id. at 384.
20. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
21. Id. at 135. The three respondents in Isaac challenged jury instructions that construed a
new Ohio statute governing burdens of proof to require defendants to prove self-defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. After respondents' trials, the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted this statute's
provision regarding affirmative defenses to place only the burden of production on the defendant and
not the burden of persuasion. See State v. Robinson, 147 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976).
The Ohio Supreme Court later held that Robinson's interpretation of the new statute applied to all
trials under that statute. See State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977). The
Ohio court limited the effect of this holding, however, by ruling that a defendant's failure to comply
with Ohio's contemporary objection rule waived any objection to erroneous jury instructions on
appeal. Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1359. The court distinguished a case allowing a bench-trial de-
fendant to challenge the assignment of the burden of proof of an affirmative defense because Ohio's
contemporaneous objection rule applies only to jury trials. Id. The Supreme Court refused to read
Isaac's petition to state a claim that Ohio's "selective retroactive application" of Robinson's interpre-
tation of the statute violated due process. 456 U.S. at 123-24 n.25. But see 456 U.S. at 137-141
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (petition raised unexhausted claim that Ohio's "selective retroactive appli-
cation" violated due process).
22. Id. at 119.
23. Id. at 121. The Court rejected the argument that the state statute governing burdens of
proof implicitly designated absence of self-defense as an element of defendants' crimes and thus that
due process required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants had not acted in
self-defense. The Court found no evidence to support such a construction of the statute.
24. Id. at 121. The Court conceded that the respondents raised a colorable constitutional claim
that due process prohibited the state from shifting the burden of proving self-defense to defendants.
Id. at 121-22. Federal habeas relief was barred, however, because respondents failed to comply with
Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule and did not demonstrate "cause for" this procedural default.
Id. at 135.
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process." 25
Gryger v. Burke26 is the primary case the Court has relied upon for the
"mere error" approach to the due process implications of state law er-
rors. Barclay, Goode, and Isaac all quoted from Gryger. In Gryger, the
Court held that the petitioner had not been denied due process when the
sentencing judge at his trial allegedly mistakenly construed the Penn-
sylvania Habitual Criminal Act to provide for a mandatory life sentence
after conviction for a fourth offense.27 Justice Jackson's opinion for the
Court contained the "mere error of state law" language quoted in Bar-
clay, Goode, and Isaac. That language, however, should be read in fuller
context:
It is said that the sentencing judge prejudiced the defendant by a mistake
in construing the Pennsylvania Habitual Criminal Act in that he regarded
as mandatory a sentence which is discretionary. It is neither clear that the
sentencing court so construed the statute nor if he did that we are empow-
ered to pronounce it an error of Pennsylvania law. . . . And it in any
event is for the Pennsylvania courts to say under its law what duty or dis-
cretion the court may have had. Nothing in the record impeaches the fair-
ness and temperateness with which the trial judge approached his task. His
action has been affi-med by the highest court of the Commonwealth. We
are not at liberty to conjecture that the trial court acted under an interpre-
tation of state law different from that we might adopt and then set up our
own interpretation as a basis for declaring that due process has been denied.
We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of due
process; otherwise, every erroneous decision by a state court on state law
would come here as a federal constitutional question.28
This excerpt from Justice Jackson's majority opinion suggests an im-
portant limitation to the often "lifted" statement that "a 'mere error of
state law' is not a denial of due process."' 29 In Gryger, the Court was not
faced with a failure to follow established law. Rather, the Gryger Court
faced what it viewed as an alleged erroneous interpretation of state law.
A vast difference exists between federal court review of alleged errors in
state courts' interpretations of state law and federal constitutional review
25. Id. at 121 n.21 (citation omitted).
26. 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
27. Id. at 731.
28. Id.
29. Four Justices objected to the Court's "mere error of state law" conclusion. Justice Rut-
ledge, joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy argued that "the denial of the very essence of
the judicial process, which is the exercise of discretion where discretion is required, is in itself a
denial of due process, not merely an error of state law of no concern to this Court." Id. at 734.
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of violations of state law. 30
Gryger does not support Justice Rehnquist's rejection in Barclay of a
due process challenge to the conceded violation of established state law.
Gryger stands for the much more limited proposition that federal courts
will not speculate as to the correctness of state courts' interpretations of
state law. Barclay, Goode, and Isaac all fail to distinguish allegations of
violations of state law from allegations of erroneous interpretations of
state law. Moreover, as the following discussion indicates, Justice Rehn-
quist's Barclay opinion fails to acknowledge the inconsistency in the
Court's treatment of the constitutional significance of errors of state law.
B. The "Entitlement" Approach
In his dissent in Barclay, Justice Marshall applied an "entitlement"
approach to analyzing errors in state procedure under the due process
clause. Justice Marshall argued that because Florida law prohibited reli-
ance on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in imposing capital pun-
ishment, the denial of this "state-created protection" was not merely a
matter of state law.3 Rather, Justice Marshall contended that "[a] crim-
inal defendant has a substantial and legitimate expectation that such cir-
cumstances will not be employed in sentencing him to death,, 32 and that
the state cannot arbitrarily abrogate this interest without violating the
federal constitution.
In defending his position, Justice Marshall relied upon Hicks v.
Oklahoma.33 Hicks supports Justice Marshall's "entitlement" approach
and illustrates the Court's inconsistency in addressing the constitutional
significance of errors of state law. A jury had sentenced Hicks to a
mandatory forty year prison term under a provision of the Oklahoma
habitual offender statute. After Hicks' conviction, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals held the statute unconstitutional. 34 Hicks then at-
tempted to set aside his sentence. Despite the unconstitutionality of the
statute, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Hicks' sentence
fell within the permissible range of punishment for his conviction and
refused to order resentencing. 35 The Supreme Court vacated Hicks' sen-
30. See infra notes 142-56 and accompanying text.
31. 103 S. Ct. at 3443.
32. Id.
33. 447 U.S. 343 (1980).
34. Thigpen v. State, 571 P.2d 467, 471 (OkIa. Crim. App. 1977).
35, 447 U.S. at 345.
FAIR PLAY
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tence and remanded. Eight Justices agreed that because the state had
provided a statutory right to have criminal sentences imposed by the dis-
cretion of a jury, the defendant's entitlement to such a jury sentence con-
stituted a "liberty" interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.36
The Court viewed Oklahoma's denial of Hicks' state law "entitlement"
to be sentenced by a jury" simply on the frail conjecture that a jury might
have imposed a sentence equally as harsh as that mandated by the invalid
habitual offender provision. . . as [an] arbitrary disregard of petitioner's
right to liberty."37 Finding a due process violation, the Court rejected the
state's argument that "all that is involved in this case is the denial of a
procedural right of exclusively state concern." 38
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 39 provides another example of the
Court's use of the "entitlement" approach to find that state-created pro-
cedural protections constitute protected interests under due process. In
Logan, the Illinois Supreme Court construed the Illinois Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act, which required the Illinois Fair Employment Prac-
tices Commission to convene a fact-finding conference within 120 days of
the filing of a charge of employment discrimination. The Illinois court
held that the Commission's failure to comply with this provision de-
prived the Commission of jurisdiction, thus extinguishing Logan's cause
of action.' The Illinois court summarily rejected Logan's federal due
process and equal protection arguments. 4 The Supreme Court's opinion
only addressed Logan's due process claim.42 The Court stated the issue
36. Id. at 346. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
37. Id.
Two weeks after the Court decided Hicks, it refused to consider a federal habeas corpus peti-
tioner's due process claim based on deprivation of an alleged state-created right to resentencing by a
jury. Mabry v. Klimas, 448 U.S. 444 (1980) (per curiam). The Court concluded that state remedies
had not been exhausted as required by the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c)
(1982). The Court expressed the view that exhaustion was particularly appropriate because Klimas'
federal claim challenged an alleged deprivation of a state-created right by a state court. The Court
pointed out that "the construction of the state statute, plainly a matter for the state courts to decide,
was at best uncertain" and concluded that "obviously, therefore, the state courts can in no sense be
said to have arbitrarily denied any right they were asked to accord." 448 U.S. at 447.
38. 447 U.S. at 346. See Note, Protecting State Procedural Rights in Federal Court: A New Role
for Substantive Due Process, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1019 (1978) (argument for a "procedural entitlement"
approach similar to that adopted by the Court in Hicks).
39. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
40. Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 99, 411 N.E.2d
277 (1980).
41. Id. at 108, 411 N.E.2d at 282.
42. In separate opinions, however, six of the Justices agreed that the challenged action also was
invalid under the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny. 455 U.S. at 439 (separate opinion of
[Vol. 63:1
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as "whether a state may terminate a complainant's cause of action be-
cause a state official, for reasons beyond the complainant's control, failed
to comply with a statutorily mandated procedure."43  The Court an-
swered this question by applying its familiar two-step approach to proce-
dural due process claims." First, it found that Logan's state created
right to use established adjudicatory procedures to redress discrimination
Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor); 455 U.S. at 443-44 (Powell,
J., with whom Rehnquist, J., joins, concurring in the judgment). The Justices based their equal
protection analysis on the different treatment afforded claims in which the state agency had con-
vened a fact-finding conference within 120 days as required by the statute and claims in which the
agency had not convened a fact-finding conference within 120 days. The Justices did not address
whether the agency's failure to comply with the statute in Logan's individual case denied him equal
protection. In Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), however, the Court rejected the use of
equal protection to challenge a state's failure to apply established rules in an individual case. The
Court in Beck, found no merit in the argument that the state's denial to the petitioner of an unbiased
grand jury, which it allegedly provided to others under state law, violated the equal protection
clause. Id. at 554-55. The Court characterized petitioner's argument as a "contention that Wash-
ington law was misapplied" and concluded that: Such misapplication cannot be shown to be an
invidious discrimination. We have said time and again that the fourteenth amendment does not
"assure uniformity of judicial decisions . . . . [or] immunity from judicial error .... " Were it
otherwise every alleged misapplication of state law would constitute a federal constitutional ques-
tion. Id. at 554-55 (citations omitted).
Justice Black strongly criticized the Court's rejection of the equal protection argument in Beck. In
a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black argued:
I cannot agree with the Court that such a gross discrimination against a single individual
with such disastrous consequences can be treated as a mere trial error. For a judicial
decision which sends a man to prison by refusing to apply settled law which has always
been and so far as appears will continue to be applied to all other defendants similarly
situated is far more than mere misapplication of state law. It is denial of equal protection
of the law and a state should no more be allowed to deny a defendant protection of its laws
through its judicial branch than through its legislative or executive branch.
Id. at 567-68 (Black, J., dissenting).
Examination of the relationship between violations of state law and equal protection is beyond the
scope of this Article. It should be noted, however, that under the Beck Court's approach, equal
protection provides a vehicle for challenging a state's failure to follow its rules only when the failure
is class-based or perhaps otherwise shown to be "invidious." It fails to provide a basis for challenge
when a person can show no more than an isolated instance of rule-breaking. See also Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (equal protection challenge to the unequal application of a facially fair
statute requires a showing of intentional or purposeful discrimination).
43. 455 U.S. at 424.
44. Under its two-step approach, the Court first asks whether a protected life, liberty, or prop-
erty interest is at stake. If so, it then decides how much process is due by balancing three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest including the functions involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Washington University Open Scholarship
10 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 63:1
was a protected property interest under the fourteenth amendment.45
Then, to determine what process was "due," the Court considered the
private interests, the governmental interests, and the risk of error. Bal-
ancing these three factors it concluded that Logan was entitled to have
the Commission consider the merits of his charge before terminating his
claim.46
45. 455 U.S. at 431. The Court characterized the statutorily mandated 120-day deadline for the
fact-finding conference as a state-imposed procedural limitation on Logan's ability to assert his
rights, rather than as a substantive element of his claim. Id. at 433. It stressed that "minimum
[procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the
State may have specified its own procedures. . . ." Id. at 432.
46. Id. at 434. In determining what process was due, the Court emphasized that Logan was not
challenging the Commission's error, "but the 'established state procedure' that destroys his entitle-
ment without according him proper procedural safeguards." Id. at 436. The Court distinguished
Logan's claim from the "tortious loss of. . .property as a result of a random and unauthorized act
by a state employee" that was at issue in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981). In Parratt, the
Court found the state's tort claims procedure provided all the process due. Id. at 543-44. The Court
in Logan explained that Parratt was not designed to reach a situation in which "it is the state system
itself that destroys a complainant's property interest by operation of law, whenever the Commission
fails to convene a timely conference-whether the Commission's action is taken through negligence,
maliciousness, or otherwise." Id. at 436. See also Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984)
(postdeprivation tort procedures provide sufficient process for tortious loss of property resulting
from random and unauthorized intentional acts of state employees; Logan is distinguished as holding
that postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where the property deprivation is effected
pursuant to an established state procedure).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently relied upon Parratt and Logan to hold that substan-
tive mistakes by administrative bodies in applying local ordinances do not create federal claims so
long as state court remedies are available to correct the errors. Cohen v. City of Philadelphia, 736
F.2d 81, (3d Cir. 1984). See also Albery v. Redding, 718 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1983); Roy v. City of
Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517 (1st Cir. 1983); Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1069 (1982); see generally Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State
Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L.F.
831; Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv.
201 (1984). In Cohen, the Third Circuit distinguished deprivations that occur as a result of an
unauthorized failure to follow prescribed state procedures from deprivations as a result of some
established state procedure. But see Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 988 (2d Cir.
1983) ("[D]eeisions made by officials with final authority over significant matters, which contravene
the requirements of a written municipal code, can constitute established state procedure.")
Whatever merit the Parratt approach may have when the issue is whether state tort remedies provide
sufficient process for random and unauthorized tortious deprivations of property, extension of its
reasoning to the failure to follow existing procedural rules governing deprivations that are author-
ized by established law is unwarranted. An approach that treats procedural safeguards as "proce-
dural entitlements," however, may encourage such an illogical extension. To adopt a view that
violations of state procedural safeguards do not violate due process so long as there is an opportunity
for state court review of such violations would resurrect the now discredited approach of Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). In Frank, the Court reasoned that the state had not deprived the
defendant of due process when the state supplied a "corrective process"--appellate review-for
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss1/2
Number 1] FAIR PLAY
Hicks and Logan indicate that, despite broad statements about "mere
errors of state law," individuals may sometimes redress a state's "depri-
vations" of established procedural "entitlements" under current substan-
tive or procedural due process doctrine.47 Unfortunately, the Court's
inconsistent approach to analyzing the due process implications of viola-
tions of state procedural law provides little guidance in predicting
whether a majority of the Court will dismiss such a claim as alleging a
"mere error of state law" or will find the claim redressable under due
process analysis.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Hewitt v. Helms,48 illus-
trates the shortcomings of addressing violations of state procedural law
under the current two-step approach to procedural due process. In
Helms, the Court reviewed a prison inmate's claim that state prison offi-
cials violated due process in confining him to administrative segregation.
The Court rejected the argument that "the mere fact that Pennsylvania
has created a careful procedural structure to regulate the use of adminis-
trative segregation indicates the existence of a protected liberty inter-
est."49 Despite its refusal to accept this argument, the Court did find a
claims of interference with the cause of justice by mob domination of a trial. Id. at 327-29, 335. The
Court repudiated this reasoning in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). See Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 420-21 (1963).
47. The Court's recent opinion in Davis v. Scherer, 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984), contained several
suggestions that its analysis would have been different had Scherer argued that the state agency's
failure to follow its own procedural regulations in terminating his employment was itself constitu-
tionally significant. Id. at 3017, 3019, 3020 n.12. For example, Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
noted:
State law may bear upon a claim under the due process clause when the property inter-
ests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created by state law. . . . Appellee's
property interest in his job under Florida law is undisputed. Appellee does not contend
here that the procedural rules in state law govern the constitutional analysis of what pro-
cess was due to him under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 3019 n. 11. Instead Scherer argued that the violations of state law stripped state officials of
their qualified immunity from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). A majority of the Court
rejected this claim. The majority held that state officials forfeit their qualified immunity under
§ 1983 only if their acts violate clearly established federal rights. The Court found it irrelevant to
the qualified immunity issue that the challenged official act violated clearly established state regula-
tions. The majority voiced concern about the wisdom of imposing damages for failure to comply
with statutes and regulations. Id. at 3021. In dissent, Justice Brennan deemed it unnecessary to
reach the issue whether violation of agency regulations would defeat immunity. He argued, how-
ever, that the existence of the regulations was relevant to whether the officials were entitled to immu-
nity. Justice Brennan reasoned that "the presence of a clear-cut regulation obviously intended to
safeguard public employees' constitutional rights certainly suggests that appellants had reason to
believe they were depriving appellee of due process." Id. at 3025.
48. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
49. Id. at 471.
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state-created liberty interest in Helms. The state had "gone beyond sim-
ple procedural guidelines" 0 and explicitly mandated certain procedures
and substantive predicates. Turning to the determination of what pro-
cess inmate Helms was due, the Court, however, required less procedural
protections than were called for by the prison's own regulations. "Un-
fortunately," Justice Stevens lamented in his dissenting opinion, "today's
majority opinion locates the due process floor at a level below existing
procedures in Pennsylvania."51
The result in Helms is questionable even under the current balancing
approach to determining what process is due. The Burger Court has
converted the inquiry concerning the minimum procedural protections
necessary to satisfy "fundamental fairness" into what is essentially a
cost-benefit analysis.52 When this determination focuses on the necessity
for providing existing procedural protections, however, the government
has already presumably done its own cost-benefit analysis and concluded
that it can "afford" to provide these protections. The Court should ac-
cept the government's evaluation. 53
C. The "Rule of Law" Approach
L Justice Blackmun's Dissent in Barclay
Justice Blackmun's dissent is the shortest of the opinions in Barclay,
but ultimately it may prove the most important. It provides the founda-
tion for the framework this Article proposes for analyzing due process
claims based on errors of state law. Justice Blackmun directly addressed
50. Id. at 471-72.
51. Id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined this
portion of Justice Stevens' dissent.
52. See, eg., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1423 (1981). See also Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldrige: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L.
REV. 28, 49-50 (1976) (criticizing the Court for leaving dignitary values out of the balance); cf.
Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clauses Nonjus-
ticiable, 60 TEx. L. REV. 875, 885-86 (1982) (arguing that the Mathews test allows for weighing the
independent value of procedure as part of the individual's interest).
53. For recent arguments over whether the Court should ever interfere with the balance the
government has struck, as embodied in existing procedural rules, compare Easterbrook, Substance
and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 85 (no) with Laycock, supra note 52 (yes).
The Court is justified in interfering with the balance struck in adopting existing procedural rules
when it determines that the government has undervalued the individual interests at stake or underes-
timated the risk of error or the value of additional safeguards. The Court is also justified in rejecting
the government's evaluation of its own interests when the Court determines that the government has
overstated the "costs" of additional protections.
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the problem of violations of established state law and found that the Con-
stitution required the state to adhere to the "rule of law."
[W]hen a state chooses to impose capital punishment, as this Court has
held a state presently has the right to do, it must be imposed by the rule of
law ..... .The errors and missteps-intentional or otherwise-come close
to making a mockery of the Florida statute and are too much for me to
condone. Petitioner Barclay, reprehensible as his conduct may have been,
deserves to have a sentencing hearing and appellate review free of such mis-
application of law, and in line with the pronouncements of this Court.
The final result reached by the Florida courts, and now by this Court, in
Barclay's case may well be deserved, but I cannot be convinced of that until
the legal process of the case has been cleansed of error that is so substantial.
The end does not justify the means even in what may be deemed to be a
"deserving" capital punishment situation.5 4
Rather than resort to the indirect "entitlement" approach55 Justice
Blackmun focused on the process by which the state had deprived Bar-
clay of his right to life. While his opinion does not explicitly refer to the
due process clause, Justice Blackmun's reference to the "rule of law" and
his call for a cleansing of the legal process suggest that his argument is
grounded in due process.56 From this brief dissent emerges an implicit
argument that due process requires compliance with established proce-
54. 103 S. Ct. 3445-46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
55. The entitlement approach could be advantgeous for individuals in situations such as prison
administrative proceedings. The Burger Court has been extremely reluctant to recognize that
threshold liberty or property interests are at stake in such proceedings. See, e.g., Olim v.
Wakinekono, 461 U.S. 238 (1983). Helms illustrates, however, that the Court has also been unrecep-
tive to arguments that prison regulatory procedures alone constitute an entitlement. See supra notes
48-50 and accompanying text. As Justice Stevens has emphasized, the problem with the Court's
analysis of due process challenges to prison proceedings is its positivist view of what constitutes a
"liberty" interest under due process. See, eg., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The Court should acknowledge that persons incarcerated for crimes retain important
liberty interests.
56. Justice Blackmun may have grounded his dissent more narrowly in the eighth amendment
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, as incorporated by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The role, however, that the rule of law plays in our system is not limited to
death penalty cases; the principle of the rule of law underlies the basic concept of due process.
Nevertheless, death penalty cases present the strongest arguments for requiring states to follow es-
tablished procedural rules. The Court has held that the Constitution requires states to adopt proce-
dures for insuring that "capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or
not at all." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). Prior to Barclay, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals required states to comply with established rules designed to assure that the state
imposed the death penalty in a constitutional manner. Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339 (1 Ith Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2375 (1984); Goode v. Wainwright, 704 F.2d 493, rey'd and remanded,
104 S. Ct. 378 (1983).
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dural protections.17
2. Support for the "Rule of Law" Approach
Because the "rule of law" approach provides the foundation for the
"fair play" framework this Article proposes in the next section, examina-
tion of the support for such an interpretation of due process is especially
important. The Court and certain members of the Court have occasion-
ally embraced a rule of law approach when defining due process. Consid-
eration of early due process opinions sheds light on contemporary
understanding of the limits imposed upon government by the rule of law
component of due process. Finally, a discussion of decisions requiring
federal administrative agencies to follow their own regulations provides
particularly useful insights into the due process implications of govern-
ment failure to follow established rules, as do recent opinions in cases
raising double jeopardy claims.
a. Early Due Process Cases
Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Hopt v. Utah 8 provides clear
support for the proposition that due process requires government to com-
ply with existing procedural protections governing deprivations of life,
liberty, and property. The Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah had
affirmed Hopt's murder conviction and death sentence. Hopt filed a writ
of error with the United States Supreme Court challenging the judgment
and sentence. One of the challenges to the judgment was that Hopt had
not been present during part of the proceedings against him,59 contrary
to a provision in the Criminal Code of Procedure of Utah, which re-
quired the defendant to be present at the trialA0
57. It is unclear whether Justice Blackmun incorporated "substantiality" into his "rule of law"
standard or assumed that federal courts would dismiss less than substantial errors as "harmless"
under federal harmless error doctrine. Several courts have recognized that the cumulative effect of
state law trial errors may constitute a violation of federal due process. See, e.g., Walker v. Engle, 703
F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 367, 368 (1983); Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282 (lst
Cir. 1982); see also L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICrION REMEDIES, § 90 nn.14.15-14.21 (Supp. 1984)
(collecting cases). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Conor, dissented
from the denial of certiorari in Walker. They would have granted certiorari to review "this novel
holding that trial rulings on the scope of prosecutorial cross-examination and rebuttal testimony are
cognizable on federal habeas." 104 S. Ct. at 368.
58. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
59. The trial judge had allowed duly appointed "triers" to "try" several challenged jurors
outside the presence of the court, the defendant, and his counsel. Id. at 576-77.
60. 110 U S. at 576.
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The Supreme Court reversed the territorial court's judgment.6" Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Harlan stated:
[T]he legislature has deemed it essential to the protection of one whose life
or liberty is involved in a prosecution for felony, that he shall be personally
present at the trial, that is, at every stage of the trial when his substantial
rights may be affected by the proceedings against him. If he be deprived of
his life or his liberty without being so present, such deprivation would be
without that due process of law required by the Constitution.
62
Though the Hopt case was from a territorial court, Justice Harlan's opin-
ion spoke of due process generally. He did not suggest any distinction
between the meaning of the parallel clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments in this regard. 63  The Court later upheld laws that permit-
ted the defendant to waive the right to be present at trial.64 The Court
61. Id. at 590.
62. Id. at 579.
63. In Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442 (1892), Justice Harlan quoted extensively from Hopi.
In Schwab, a state prisoner claimed that he was held in custody in violation of the Constitution
because he had not been present when the state appellate court affirmed his death sentence. The
Court found that the common law rule, which required the accused to be present at the judgment
but not at the appellate review, was consistent with due process of law. Id. at 448-51.
64. See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 209 (1915); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
Similarly, in Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892), the Court found that a defendant who elected
to plead guilty and thus under applicable state law waived his right to trial by jury had not been
deprived of due process.
In Hopi, the Court had rejected the argument that the defendant had waived his right to be pres-
ent by his failure to object, holding that the defendant lacked the power to dispense with the required
personal presence. Citing Blackstone, Justice Harlan refuted the suggestion that only the defendant
was concerned with whether his trial had complied with the statute:
The public has an interest in his life and liberty. Neither can be lawfully taken except in
the mode prescribed by law. That which the law makes essential in proceedings involving
the deprivation of life or liberty cannot be dispensed with or affected by the consent of the
accused, much less by his mere failure, when on trial and in custody, to object to unauthor-
ized methods.
Id. Accord Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); cf Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118 (1891)
(record in capital punishment cases must affirmatively show defendant's presence during sentenc-
ing). But see Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 341-43 (1970) (holding that a defendant can lose the
right to be present and thus be excluded from the courtroom if, after warning, disruptive conduct
continues). The Allen Court identified the sixth amendment confrontation clause as the basis for a
defendant's constitutional right to be present during every stage of a criminal trial. In Allen, the
appellate court had relied in part upon Hop: in holding that a trial judge can never exclude a defend-
ant from his own trial. The Supreme Court disagreed:
The broad dicta in Hopt v. Utah, and Lewis v. United Staes, that a trial can never continue
in the defendant's absence have been expressly rejected. Diaz v. United States. We accept
instead the statement of Mr. Justice Cardozo who, speaking for the Court in Snyder v.
Massachusetts said: "No doubt the privilege may be lost by consent or at times even by
misconduct."
397 U.S. at 342-43 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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viewed these cases as presenting due process challenges to the fairness of
the application of established law, rather than to a violation of a plain
statutory mandate as in Hopt.65 The Court applied an extension of this
reasoning to uphold the conviction of a defendant who consented
through counsel to the examination of a juror outside his presence under
state law that treated defendant's occasional nonprejudicial absence as
nonmaterial error.66
The Hopt Court's view that the failure to follow established procedures
violates due process is not the only view offered by the Court in early due
process cases. Other cases contain statements that initially appear to
support the approach in Hopt, but on closer reading suggest a more lim-
ited view of due process. For example, in Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel.
Morgan,67 the Court defined due process as "the due course of legal pro-
ceedings, according to those rules and forms which have been established
for the protection of private rights."' 68 Despite this definition, however,
the Kennard Court also stated that the question was not "whether the
courts below having jurisdiction of the case and parties have followed the
law, but whether the law if followed, would have furnished Kennard the
protection guaranteed by the Constitution. Irregularities and mere er-
rors in the proceedings can only be corrected in the State courts. Our
authority does not extend beyond an examination of the power of the
courts below to proceed at all. ''69
65. In Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) the Court distinguished Hopt, pointing out that
in Hopt the local code of criminal procedure declared that "the defendant must be personally present
at trial." The Court explained that the ground of decision in Hopt "was the violation of the plain
mandate of the local statute; and the power of the accused or his counsel to dispense with the
requirement. . . was denied on the ground that his life could not be lawfully taken except in the
mode prescribed by law." 237 U.S. at 340-41. See also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448
(1912).
66. Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164 (1906). More recent challenges to defendants' absences
from trials have been raised under the "incorporated" sixth amendment confrontation clause guar-
antee. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (discussed supra note 64).
67. 98 U.S. 480 (1875).
68. Id. at 481.
69. Id. See also In re Converse, 139 U.S. 624, 631 (1891). Similarly, in Arrowsmith v.
Harmoning, 118 U.S. 194, 195-96 (1886), the Court stated:
[A] state canot be deemed guilty of a violation of this constitutional obligation simply
because one of its courts, while acting within its jurisdiction, has made an erroneous deci-
sion. The legislature of a state performs its whole duty under the Constitution in this
particular when it provides a law for the government of its courts while exercising their
respective jurisdictions, which if followed, will furnish the parties the necessary constitu-
tional protection.
As these quotations from Kennard and Arrowsmith illustrate, the Court emphasized the jurisdic-
tion of the state court in early due process challenges to state convictions. Paul M. Bator and Gary
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A comparison of Hopt and its early progeny with the Court's state-
ments in cases such as Kennard leads to the conclusion that the Court
was no more consistent in its early considerations of the due process im-
plications of failure to follow established procedures than it is today.
b. Justice Black's Definition of Due Process
Justice Black's definition of due process, as set forth in his dissent in In
re Winship,7° also required the government to comply with established
law: "For me the only correct meaning of that phrase is that our Gov-
ernment must proceed according to the "law of the land" - that is, ac-
cording to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted
by court decisions."71 Justice Black further asserted that "the Due Pro-
Peller have offered two explanations for the Court's emphasis on jurisdiction in early due process
cases. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 441 (1963); Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 579 (1982). Bator argues that the frequent references to jurisdiction arose because of the
traditional rule that the writ of habeas corpus was available only for challenges that went to the
lower court's jurisdiction. Bator, supra at 463-99. Peller counters that the Court's discussion of
jurisdiction related to the merits of the due process claims and reflected the existing view that a
judgment in the regular course of proceedings by a court of competent jurisdiction satisfied due
process. Peller, supra at 621-34.
Both Bator and Peller's explanations have merit. In light of the close connection historically
between the development of the writ of habeas corpus and the implementation of due process, it is
not surprising that it is difficult at times to separate the Court's discussion of the scope of habeas
review from its discussion of the merits of due process claims. See, eg., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
402 (1962) (referring to the "union of the right to due process drawn from Magna Carta and the
remedy of habeas corpus"; "[v]indication of due process is precisely its historic office"). See also D.
MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA: DUALISM OF POWER AND LIBERTY 3-4. See
generally L. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 4 (1981) (collecting and discussing authorities
on the history of habeas corpus). At times the Court's concern with jurisdiction in early due process
cases is attributable to its view of the nature of the writ of habeas corpus. See, eg., Ex parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, 375 (1879); see also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 307, 316, 327 (1915); see generally D.
MEADOR, supra at 58-63 (1966). In cases such as Kennard and Arrowsmith, on the other hand, the
Court's discussion of the lower court's jurisdiction seems to refer to the merits of the due process
claim. Kennard and Arrowsmith were before the Court on writs of error, not writs of habeas corpus.
It should be noted, however, that historically the writ of error was also a more limited basis for
review of a lower court's judgment than appeal. See B. CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND
PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 60-62 (1880) (lectures deliv-
ered to Harvard Law students during 1872-73). In cases challenging state court convictions, such as
Kennard and Arrowsmith, the Court's statements may also be explained as attributable to federalism
concerns.
70. 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 382 (footnote omitted). Justice Black noted that his view of the full applicability of
the Bill of Rights to the states was not based on the due process clause "standing alone" but on "the
language of the entire first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, as illuminated by the legislative
history surrounding its adoption." Id at 382-83 n. 11 (citation omitted). Given his definition of due
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cess Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, in and of
itself does not add to those provisions, but in effect states that our gov-
ernments are 'governments of law and constitutionally bound to act only
according to law.' "72
The issue presented in Winship was whether due process requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt during the adjudicatory stage of juvenile de-
linquency proceedings when a juvenile is charged with an act that would
constitute a crime if committed by an adult.7" The majority held that
due process required the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.74 Justice Black disagreed. He stressed that "as long as a particu-
lar jurisdiction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, then the Due
Process Clause commands that every trial in that jurisdiction must ad-
here to that standard," but argued that "when . . .a state through its
duly constituted legislative branch decides to apply a different standard,
then that standard, unless it is otherwise unconstitutional, must be ap-
plied to insure that persons are treated according to the 'law of the
land.' "I'
Justice Black argued that the historical meaning of due process sup-
ported his interpretation.76 To assess the support for his interpretation,
Justice Black's definition must be separated into two principal assertions.
First, the process provided by written statutory and constitutional provi-
sions is due process. Second, the due process clauses require govern-
ments to adhere to existing procedural standards. A short review of
Supreme Court cases indicates that the purely positivist approach of Jus-
tice Black's first assertion truncates the appropriate scope of the due pro-
cess clauses. The Court has clearly rejected the assertion that due
process imposes no independent normative limits on government.
The Supreme Court first interpreted the due process clause of the fifth
process, Black's reference to the "entire first section" indicates his reliance upon the privileges or
immunities clause as the textual basis for incorporating the Bill of Rights. See Adamson v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally Yarborough, Justice Black, The
Fourteenth Amendment, and Incorporation, 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 231 (1976).
72. 397 U.S. at 382.
73. Id. at 359.
74. Id. at 368.
75. Id. at 386.
76. "'Due process of law' was originally used as a shorthand expression for governmental pro-
ceedings according to the 'law of the land' as it existed at the time of those proceedings. Both
phrases are derived from the laws of England and have traditionally been regarded as meaning the
same thing." Id. at 378.
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amendment in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.77
The Murray's Lessee Court squarely rejected the argument that the
clause could "be so construed to leave congress free to make any process
'due process of law,' by its mere will."' 78 Justice Curtis, writing for the
Court, relied upon Lord Coke's conclusion that the words "due process
of law" were equivalent in meaning to Magna Carta's "by the law of the
land.' ' 79  Consistent with Lord Coke's view that the "law of the land"
included some natural law limitations on parliamentary power,80 the
77. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
78. Id. at 276.
79. Id. For a contrary argument, see Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1 (1979).
80. For a contrary argument, see Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 96. Easterbrook accepts that
Magna Carta's "law of the land" provision is one of the sources of the due process clause in our
Constitution, but argues that under its English law antecedents, "[p]rocedures named in statutes
were due process of law." Id. at 95-96. Easterbrook attacks the dichotomy in the current interpreta-
tion of due process that allows legislatures to define substantive entitlements but refuses to recognize
legislative control over what process is due. Easterbrook describes Lord Coke as a "solitary voice in
English law" insofar as he insisted that the "by the law of the land" language of the Magna Carta
included some natural law limitations on parliamentary power. Id. at 96. Easterbrook concedes,
however, that Lord Coke's Institutes were well read in the colonies and thus, "the Framers may have
thought Coke right and incorporated his error into our fundamental law." Id. He also admits that
the Supreme Court's first interpretation of due process in Murray's Lessee drew upon Coke's natural
law precepts. Id. at 101. Easterbrook is willing to assume that the due process clause embodies
Lord Coke's natural law views, but trivializes the impact of this assumption through his static
method of constitutional interpretation. Easterbrook believes that, apart from legislatively pre-
scribed procedures, due process includes only those procedures that Lord Coke considered inaliena-
ble, such as indictment and jury trial. Further, in his view, due process applies only to deprivations
of life, liberty, and property as those terms were then understood. Id. at 97-98. Easterbrook
concludes:
It may be assumed that the Due Process Clause embodies Coke's views at their broadest.
This would not affect very many cases. whatever reading holds, the Due Process Clause
places little or no legitimate restraints on the contents of legislation. Judges and Presidents
must follow rules laid down in "law"; judges may not act ex parte in important matters;
but Congress may establish as law such procedures as it pleases, subject only to the con-
straint that it not abrogate certain long-recognized judicial procedures when fundamental
natural liberties are at stake. Because Coke's fundamental procedures were secured by
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, this branch of the language's ancestry drops out. All
that is left are prohibitions designed to compel other departments of government to follow
the legislature's plan.
Id. at 98-99 (footnotes omitted).
Easterbrook unwittingly provides support for an interpretation of due process that requires gov-
ernment to play by the rules. His primary argument that due process imposes no independent
normative limits on legislative control of process, however, will persuade only those who agree with
his static view of constitutional interpretation. ("language and structure, informed by constitutional
history, are the proper basis of interpretation and. . . perhaps, they are all that count."). Id. at 91.
For criticisms of this approach to constitutional interpretation, see M. PERRY, THE CONsTrru-
TION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITU-
Washington University Open Scholarship
20 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Court concluded that "[t]he article is a restraint on the legislative as well
as on the executive and judicial powers of the government."81
Despite this early rejection of a purely positivist interpretation of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment, in Walker v. Sauvinet,82 the
Court momentarily embraced a view of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause that allowed state legislatures to control what process was
due. Chief Justice Waite's opinion for the Court cited Murray's Lessee,
but rejected Walker's claim that a Louisiana statute deprived him of a
right to trial by jury in a civil case and thus violated due process. The
Court stated: "Due process of law is process due according to the law of
the land. This process in the States is regulated by the law of the
State."83 Walker's interpretation of fourteenth amendment due process
was short-lived, however. In Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan,84 the
Court implicitly acknowledged that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment imposed normative limits on state procedures. 85 Sim-
ilarly, in Davidson v. New Orleans,86 Justice Miller asked, "can a State
make anything due process of law which, by its own legislation, it
chooses to declare such?' 87 To adopt such a view "is to hold that the
prohibition to the States is of no avail, or has no application where the
invasion of private rights is affected under the forms of State
legislation. ' '88
The view that the federal constitution imposes normative limits, often
referred to as a requirement of "fundamental fairness," now is well estab-
lished in the Court's interpretation of both due process clauses. The re-
jection of Black's assertion that due process does not embody
independent normative standards, however, does not require rejection of
his assertion that due process requires government to follow procedures
TIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 59 (1955); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983); Schauer, An Essay
on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,
27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
81. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276.
82. 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
83. Id. at 93.
84. 92 U.S. 480 (1875).
85. Id. at 481.
86. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
87. Id. at 102.
88. Id.
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that it has adopted as positive law. To the contrary, several Supreme
Court cases support the notion that "fundamental fairness" includes a
requirement that government play by the rules. For example, Justice
Harlan's opinion in Hopt and its early progeny support this argument.
More recent support is found in federal administrative law cases and in
cases raising double jeopardy claims.
c. Federal Administrative Law Cases
A long series of federal administrative law cases requiring agencies to
comply with their own regulations provides additional support for a view
that due process requires government to play by the rules.8 9 Although
the rationale of these cases was often unclear,9" until recently they were
commonly viewed as resting upon the principle that due process requires
agencies to follow their own regulations.9
89. See cases cited infra notes 92-100.
90. Rodney Smolla recently observed that in articulating the principle that administrators are
bound by their own rules, "the Supreme Court has moved intermittently between constitutional and
administrative law vocabulary, generally leaving the legal source of the principle ambiguous."
Smolla, The Erosion of the Principle that the Government Must Follow Self-Imposed Rules, 52 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 472, 476 (1984). Smolla calls for a "new vigilance" in enforcing the principle of
binding administrative rules and argues that:
[V]irtually all rules binding as a matter of administrative law should also be binding under
the Constitution. Constitutionally binding rules are three types: rules that create substan-
tive entitlements; rules that create procedural entitlements; and rules that implicate specific
enumerated constitutional guarantees such as the first amendment or the ex post facto
clause.
Id. at 502-03.
Smolla's framework relies heavily on "entitlement" analysis, but he fails to explain why rules that
create substantive or procedural "entitlements" are binding. If agency procedural rules are viewed
as constituting threshold protected interests rather than as part of the process due to one deprived of
life, liberty, or property, then due process would seem to require only that the agency not "arbitrar-
ily" violate its rule. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980); Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct.
3418, 3443 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 38 (arguing for an "entitle-
ment" approach, but acknowledging that it would prohibit only "arbitrary" violations of state proce-
dural rights). See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
91. See, eg., Berger, Do Regulations Really Bind Regulators? 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 137, 149-152
(1967). Berger pointed out that Gellhorn and Byse, in their 1960 edition of ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES & COMMENTS, viewed Supreme Court decisions requiring compliance with procedural regu-
lations as grounded in one of two rationales: "'either that the existing regulations have the force
and effect of law' and must therefore be deemed binding on the government as well as on the citizen,
or that they embody a defacto recognition of minimum standards or procedural decency and may
therefore be roughly equated with due process." Berger, supra, at 149. Berger believed the second
alternative open to question but accepted the first rationale as "solidly based":
Under our system, the law binds all, officers as well as citizens, "from the highest to the
lowest." Compliance with a regulation which has "the force of law," moreover, is required
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In 1923, Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court in
Bilokumsky v. Tod,92 assumed "that one under investigation with a view
to deportation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules
promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to law." 93 In Arizona Grocery v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.,94 the Court stated that the
Interstate Commerce Commission could not "acting in its quasi-judicial
capacity ignore its own pronouncement promulgated in its quasi-legisla-
tive capacity and retroactively repeal its own enactment as to the reason-
ableness of the rate it has prescribed."95 In later cases, the Court again
focused on the agencies' failure to follow their own procedural regula-
tions. 96 The Court has distinguished procedural rules designed "to pro-
tect the interest of the individual" 97 from rules adopted to promote the
orderly transaction of business.98 The Court requires agencies to follow
the former, but not the latter.99
While the Burger Court has significantly diminished the importance of
by due process in its primal sense; i.e., a regulation like a statute, is part of "the law of the
land" which must be observed by an official for the protection of a citizen.
Id. at 149-50 (footnotes omitted). But cf. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring and dissenting in part) ("This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now
firmly established and, I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with
that sword.") (emphasis added).
92. 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
93. Id. at 155. The Court upheld Bilokumsky's deportation, however, because no agency rule
required that a person under investigation be informed of the rights to counsel and to refuse to
answer questions. Id. at 155-56.
94. 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
95. Id. at 389.
96. See, eg., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959);
United States ex reL Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363
(1957); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). In Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963), the
Court extended the principle of earlier administrative law cases to invalidate a contempt citation
when a congressional committee had violated its own rules.
97. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152 (1945); see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235
(1974) ("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their
own procedures. This is so even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than
otherwise would be required.").
98. See Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954).
99. See, eg., American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532 (1970). The Court
rejected the argument that an ICC rule was "adopted to confer important procedural benefits upon
individuals." The Court concluded:
Thus there is no reason to exempt this case from the general principle that "[i]t is always
within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its proce-
dural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case
the ends of justice require it. The action of either in such a case is not reviewable except
upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party."
Id. at 539 (citations omitted).
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this long line of administrative law cases, it has not overruled the earlier
cases. Indeed, cases such as United States v. Nixon,'" illustrate the con-
tinued validity of the earlier cases. In Nixon, the Court stated:
[I]t is theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or revoke
the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor's authority. But he has not
done so. So long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is
bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign composed of the
three branches is bound to respect and enforce it.'
01
The Burger Court has undercut, however, the constitutional significance
of these federal administrative law cases. In Board of Curators, Univer-
sity of Missouri v. Horowitz,'°2 Justice Rehnquist rejected Horowitz's
contention that the Board of Curators' alleged failure to follow its own
procedural rules when it dismissed her from medical school presented a
federal constitutional claim. The Court concluded that Horowitz's reli-
ance upon federal administrative law cases to support this contention was
misplaced. Justice Rehnquist explained that those cases "enunciate prin-
ciples of federal administrative law rather than of constitutional law
binding upon the States."'' 0 3
Justice Marshall, dissenting in part, characterized this portion of the
Court's opinion in Horowitz as "nothing more than confusing dictum,"
given the Court's conclusion that the school had followed its own
rules. 1 4 Justice Marshall admitted that the Court had not expressly
grounded the federal administrative law decision relied upon by
Horowitz"0 5 in the due process clause. In Justice Marshall's opinion,
however, this did not excuse the Court's failure to respond to Horowitz's
argument "that some compliance with previously established rules-par-
ticularly rules providing procedural safeguards-is constitutionally re-
quired before the State or one of its agencies may deprive a citizen of a
valuable liberty or property interest."'10
6
In United States v. Caceres,"°7 the Court again addressed the question
whether the Constitution requires federal agencies to follow their own
rules. Caceres held that a court may admit as evidence in a criminal trial
100. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
101. Id. at 696.
102. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
103. Id. at 92 n.8.
104. Id. at 108 n.22 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
105. Horowitz relied upon Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). See supra note 96.
106. 435 U.S. at 108 n.22.
107. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
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conversations seized in violation of Internal Revenue Service regulations
governing electronic eavesdropping. Writing for the Court, Justice Ste-
vens concluded that neither the Constitution nor any statute required the
agency to adopt the eavesdropping rules and rejected arguments that
their violation raised any constitutional questions.108
Although the Burger Court has undercut the constitutional signifi-
cance of many of the Court's earlier administrative law decisions, it has
affirmed that the Constitution places some limits on agency violations of
established rules. Importantly, in Caceres the Court acknowledged that
there are two occasions when an agency is constitutionally bound to fol-
low its own rules: First, when due process requires the agency to adopt
rules;' 0 9 second, when individuals have reasonably relied on agency regu-
lations promulgated for their guidance or benefit and have suffered sub-
stantially because of the agency's violation of the rules.110
d. Double Jeopardy Cases
Finally, recent decisions in cases raising double jeopardy claims pro-
vide support for the rule of law interpretation of due process. In Whalen
v. United States,' the Court relied upon the double jeopardy clause and
the constitutional principle of separation of powers to invalidate a federal
court's imposition of multiple punishments that Congress had not au-
thorized. In a footnote, the Court suggested that the due process clause
108. Id. at 751-53. The regulations were contained in an IRS Manual and had been instituted
pursuant to a memorandum from the Attorney General mandating Justice Department approval of
electronic eavesdropping. The Court noted that "it does not necessarily follow, however, as a matter
of either logic or law, that the agency had no duty to obey them." Id. at 751-52 n.14 (citing Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 260 (1974)); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359
U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); United States ex rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260 (1954)). The Caceres Court observed that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1982), authorizes judicial invalidation of action taken by an agency "without observance of
procedure required by law," but pointed out that Caceres was not brought under the APA; the
remedy sought was not the invalidation of agency action but exclusion of evidence. 440 U.S. at 753-
54.
109. Id. at 749-51. The Court distinguished Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) as involving
rules "designed 'to afford [the alien] due process of law' by providing 'safeguards against essentially
unfair procedures' "440 U.S. at 749. The Caceres Court observed that "unlike Bridges v. Wixon, the
agency was not required by the Constitution or by statute to adopt any particular procedures or rules
before engaging in consensual monitoring and recording." 440 U.S. at 749-50. Cf. Walker v. Prison
Review Bd., 694 F.2d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 1982) (state parole regulation intended to benefit parole
candidate and to fulfill due process obligations is analogous to rule in Bridges rather than Caceres
and must be followed).
110. 440 U.S. at 752-53.
111. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
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of the fourteenth amendment would have required the same result if the
statute involved had been state rather than federal:
The Court has held that the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in
the Federal Constitution is not mandatory of the states. . . It is possible,
therefore, that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not, through the Four-
teenth Amendment, circumscribe the penal authority of state courts in the
same manner that it limits the power of federal courts. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, would presumably pro-
hibit state courts from depriving persons of liberty or property as punish-
ment for criminal conduct except to the extent authorized by state law. 12
Justice Rehnquist dissented and objected to the implication "that a
state court can ever err in the interpretation of its own law and that such
an error would create a federal question reviewable by this Court."13 He
distinguished cases of "retroactive lawmaking" in which a state court
interprets a statute in an unforeseeable manner.114 Justice Rehnquist ex-
pressed concern that the Court's opinion would "raise doubts about
questions of state law that heretofore had been thought to be the exclu-
sive province of the highest courts of the individual states."'1 5
Justice Rehnquist in Ohio v. Johnson,16 again addressed the federal
constitutional limitations on state courts' sentencing decisions. In John-
son, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court acknowledged that the
double jeopardy prohibition against cumulative punishments "is designed
to ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits
established by the legislature.""' 7 The Court accepted "the Ohio
Supreme Court's determination that the Ohio legislature did not intend
cumulative punishment for the two pairs of crimes involved here;" 1's but
reversed the state court's ruling that double jeopardy barred further pros-
ecution. The Court concluded that the state court had failed to distin-
guish between double jeopardy's bar to cumulative punishments and a
bar to further prosecution." 9
In summation, the "rule of law" approach suggested by Justice Black-
112. Id. at 689-90 n.4.
113 Id. at 706.
114. Id. at 706 n.2.
115. Id. at 706.
116. 104 S. Ct. 2536 (1984).
117. Id. at 2541.
118. Id.
119. Id. See also Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983) (accepting state supreme court's
interpretation of state statutes, but reversing that court's legal conclusion that statutes violated
double jeopardy).
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mun's dissent in Barclay, enjoys scattered support. Hopt provides the
strongest support for the proposition that violations of established proce-
dural law are contrary to the due process clause. Justice Black's dissent
in Winship also supports the "rule of law" interpretation of due process.
Finally, a long line of federal administrative law decisions and recent
double jeopardy cases indicates that the Court is sometimes willing to
interpret the Constitution to require federal agencies or states to adhere
to their established rules and procedures.
II. THE FAIR PLAY APPROACH
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government."12 0 This understanding of due process
has led the Court to require that government afford minimum procedural
safeguards when it seeks to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.
"Fundamental fairness" is the traditional standard for determining mini-
mally adequate procedural protections. The Burger Court has turned
this inquiry into a cost-benefit analysis, however, substituting the ques-
tion "is it worth it" for "is it fair." '21 This move from "fairness" to
"efficiency" unfortunately has lost much in the translation. 122
Eventually, the diversion from a discussion of fairness will lead to a
failure to consider fairness. To the extent the Court remains aware that
"fairness" underlies the due process inquiry, its conception of fairness is
120. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
121. See supra note 44 for a discussion of the Court's current approach.
122. See, e.g., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as Social-Cost Accounting, 9 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1423, 1423 (1981).
Justice Stevens has argued that a court should not apply the Mathews v. Eldrige cost-benefit analy-
sis when a person is deprived of "liberty" rather than "property." "The issue is one of fundamental
fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs against the societal benefits . . . . For the value of
protecting our liberty from deprivation by the State without due process of law is priceless."
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 60 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Spaziano
v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3167 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (qualitative differences exist between
the three protected categories of life, liberty, and property, which require correspondingly height-
ened procedural safeguards).
John Rawls, a contemporary moral philosopher, argues that "justice has an absolute weight with
respect to the principle of utility . . . . This means that an unjust institution or law cannot be
justified by an appeal to a greater net sum of advantages, and that the duty of fair play cannot be
analogously overridden." J. RAWLS, LEGAL OBLIGATION AND THE DuTY OF FAIR PLAY, reprinted
in J. RACHELS, UNDERSTANDING MORAL PHILOSOPHY 379 (1976). Rawls' essay focuses on civil
disobedience. The duty of fair play that he speaks of is a duty that arises when one accepts the
benefits of a "mutually beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation. . . .the advantages. . . [of
which] can only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates." Id. at 374.
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one that demands fair rules. Fair rules are an important element of fair-
ness. Another element of fairness is "fair play," which the Court has
largely overlooked. "Fair play" means that government follows its estab-
lished rules and its established procedures for changing the rules.123
If asked to think about fairness, most persons in our society probably
would agree that fairness includes "playing by the rules." From a very
early age, children develop a strong sense of the importance of following
the rules of the game.124 This notion of fair play is consistent with the
text of the due process clauses. 125 In addition to common notions of
fairness and apparent textual support, a less obvious, structural argument
supports treating government's failure to follow its own procedural rules
as a violation of due process. Underlying the view of due process as a
protection against arbitrary actions of government is the principle of the
rule of law - laws and not individual will should govern society. Implicit
in the rule of law is a separation between the process of formulating rules
and the processes of interpreting and applying rules. This separation is
referred to here as "due separation of processes."
Justice Blackmun's "rule of law" dissent in Barclay and the sources of
support for his approach examined above provide implicit support for the
proposed fair play approach. Justice Blackmun's dissent provides the
principle that a state can impose criminal punishment only by the rule of
law; substantial departures from established law fail to satisfy this re-
quirement. 126 In his Winship dissent, Justice Black also relied upon the
rule of law to support his assertion that the due process clauses require
governments to follow their own rules. 27 Overall, Justice Black's inter-
pretation of due process is inadequate because it fails to acknowledge
123. Cf United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3430, 3457 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In a just
society those who govern, as well as those who are governed, must obey the law.").
124. Anyone who has observed young children's game playing can verify this assertion. Nothing
disrupts a game as quickly as an accusation of not "playing by the rules." It seems unlikely that an
assurance that the broken rule was not essential to a fair game would placate a child's sense of moral
outrage, generally expressed as "that's not fair." See generally J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGEMENT
OF THE CHILD (1932) (children learn respect for rules through playing games). Cf C. GILLIGAN, IN
A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (exploring
gender differences in moral development). For example, one might imagine a fair game of hide-and-
seek which required the "hunter" to count only to 15. If, however, the rules of the game require a
count to 20, the "hiders" will object strongly to a hunter who breaks this rule.
125. See infra note 137.
126. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
127. Justice Black in Winship stated:
Our ancestors' ancestors had known the tyranny of the kings and the rule of man and it
was, in my view, in order to insure against such actions that the Founders wrote into our
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that due process also requires fair rules. Nevertheless, by requiring states
to follow existing rules, Justice Black's definition points to an aspect of
fairness that the Court frequently overlooks. Justice Blackmun's and
Justice Black's dissents reveal the importance of compliance with estab-
lished rules as an underlying principle of due process. Hopt, Whalen,
and the federal administrative law cases are also helpful in understanding
the limitations the rule of law imposes on governmental actions.
Justice Harlan's opinion in Hopt sets the stage for an understanding of
the fair play approach. Hopt held that when the legislature had deemed a
felony defendant's personal presence at trial essential, due process re-
quired compliance with the statutory requirement. 128 Later cases upheld
convictions despite defendants' absences when the applicable state law
allowed the defendant to waive the right to be present. 129 In these later
cases, the proceedings complied with established law; in Hopt, the pro-
ceedings did not comply with the applicable law.1 30
Similarly, the Court in Whalen, assumed that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment limited the sentencing power of state courts to
that authorized by state law. The petitioner in Whalen, challenged his
conviction under federal criminal statutes on the grounds that it consti-
tuted a multiple punishment. The majority found that the sentences im-
posed violated not only the double jeopardy clause but also the doctrine
of separation of powers, because the federal court exceeded its authority
in imposing sentences Congress had not authorized. As Justice Stewart's
footnote pointed out, however, the problem of courts' exceeding legisla-
tive authority when imposing criminal punishments has constitutional
implications beyond those arising from the separation of powers between
the branches of the federal government.13 1 Justice Rehnquist's opinion
for the Court in Ohio v. Johnson reaffirmed Whalen's recognition that the
Constitution requires state courts to follow the legislative plan when im-
posing criminal sentences.132
Failure to play by the rules can occur within a branch of government
as well as between branches of government. The administrative law cases
own Magna Carta the fundamental principle of the rule of law, as expressed in the histori-
cally meaningful phrase "due process of law."
397 U.S. at 384 (Black, J., dissenting).
128. 110 U.S. at 579. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 65.
130. See supra note 65-66.
131. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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discussed earlier illustrate this point. Despite the Burger Court's "dress-
ing down" of some of these cases, they continue to provide insight into
the essential structural attributes of the rule of law. They stand as an
example of the importance of the separation between the processes of
rule-making and rule-application. From Arizona Grocery to Nixon, the
Court has refused to condone the blurring of these distinct functions.1 33
While an agency may have the power to repeal or reformulate existing
rules, until it does, it must adhere to the rules. It cannot engage in the ad
hoc repeal of rules by refusing to apply existing rules.
From these sources the rough contours of a "fair play" model for ana-
lyzing errors of state procedural law under due process emerge. The due
separation of processes implicit in the rule of law provides the basis for
this model. The fair play approach posits that due process requires gov-
erment to comply with duly established procedural safeguards when de-
priving a person of life, liberty, or property. Until the appropriate
governmental body repeals or modifies these rules by duly established
procedures, government is required to follow them. Government must
respect the boundary between rule-making and rule-application.
III. FAIR PLAY AND FEDERALISM
A. The Scope of Fair Play
The proposed approach would have significant effects upon contempo-
rary conceptions of federalism.134 But these effects should not be exag-
gerated. Adoption of the "fair play" approach would not mean that
"every erroneous decision by a state court on state law would come [to
the Court] as a federal constitutional question." '35 First, due process is
the source of the fair play approach and thus the fair play approach ap-
plies only when government deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Second, the proposed approach extends only to those state law violations
that consist of a failure to comply with a "procedural safeguard."
Because fair play applies only when the state seeks to deprive a person
133. See supra notes 95-96, 92-101 and accompanying text.
134. In Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984), the Court held that
the eleventh amendment bar applies to pendent state law claims and is not overriden by allegations
that state officials' actions are contrary to state law. The Pennhurst holding severely limits federal
courts' jurisdiction to review state law claims. Fair play would ameliorate the effects of the holding
in Pennhurst by elevating some errors of state law to the status of federal constitutional claims.
135. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 734 (1948), quoted in Engle v. Isaacs, 456 U.S. 107, 121 n.21
(1982).
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of a protected life, liberty, or property interest, it differs from the Hicks
approach of viewing procedural safeguards as constituting protected enti-
tlements.1 36  Using the entitlement approach to address government's
failure to follow its own procedural rules is problematic. While sub-
-stance and procedure are more intertwined than traditional categorical
thinking reflects, there are important distinctions between the two that
may be overlooked in an approach that regards procedural protections as
substantive entitlements. 137 Our adversary system is incapable of pro-
ducing completely accurate results when depriving persons of substantive
entitlements. We cannot be sure deprivations are not erroneous; what we
can do is provide procedures designed both to reduce the inherent risk of
erroneous deprivations and to provide individuals with a sense of having
been treated fairly and with respect. By focusing on procedure as an
entitlement, and then asking whether a state "arbitrarily" deprived a per-
son of this procedural entitlement, 138 the Hicks approach may lose sight
of the instrumental and intrinsic importance of insisting that govern-
ments follow procedural rules. The consistent application of procedural
rules promotes accuracy when a state terminates individuals' substantive
interests and assures that the state treats affected individuals with
respect.
The second major limitation of the proposed fair play approach is that
it applies only to violations of state rules that constitute "procedural safe-
guards." Drawing guidance from the federal administrative law cases,
this Article distinguishes procedural safeguards-rules that are designed
to protect individuals' interests-from procedural rules that are designed
to promote efficiency or administrative convenience. 139 Courts should
determine whether an established procedure constitutes a procedural
safeguard by looking to the values underlying the due process clauses.
Thus, when a state adopts a procedural rule that is designed to further
accuracy or to foster human dignity,"' the rule should be considered a
136. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text; see also Smolla, supra note 90 (adopting
"procedural entitlement" approach); Note, supra note 38 (same).
137. See Laycock, supra note 52, at 887-89 (arguing that a due process theory that fails to distin-
guish between substance and procedure is inconsistent with the text of the Constitution).
138. See supra note 90.
139. See Smolla, supra note 90, at 505 (recognizing an analogous limitation); Note, supra note
38, at 1024 n.20, 1047-48 n.126 (same).
140. For further discussion of due process values, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 10-7 (1978); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U.L. REv. 885 (1981).
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procedural safeguard for fair play analysis, regardless of whether the rule
would otherwise be constitutionally required. Insisting on compliance
with these established procedures is critical, not just because it facilitates
the accurate application of substantive law in particular cases, but be-
cause it provides individuals with the sense that the system has treated
them fairly and with respect. 14 1
B. Interpretation of State Law
The due separation of processes model for dealing with errors of state
law recognizes that state court interpretation is a legitimate part of rule
application. If the challenged error of state law is an allegedly erroneous
interpretation of a state rule, rather than a violation or ad hoe repeal of
the rule, due separation of processes is not offended. 42 Thus fair play is
consistent with the Court's practice of regarding state courts' interpreta-
tions of state law as authoritative. Unfortunately, the boundary between
interpretation and violation is not always clear. 143 The real challenge in
the development of this model is to provide guidance in locating the di-
viding line.'"
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,'45 the Court stressed that "state courts are the
ultimate expositors of state law. . . and that [federal courts] are bound
141. The theory of due separation of processes may have implications beyond requiring compli-
ance with established procedural safeguards, but for the reasons already stated the proposed fair play
approach is limited to this context.
142. The problem of distinguishing between authoritative interpretations of state procedural
rules and violations of these rules also arises under approaches that regard procedural rules as "pro-
cedural entitlements." See Note, supra note 38, at 1025-26 n.25, 1027 n.29, 1047-48 n.162; cf.
Smolla, supra note 90, at 500 (arguing that "the existence of an entitlement is never entirely a state
law question").
143. The summary disposition of many cases by state appellate courts compounds the difficulty
of discerning this boundary.
144. Cases involving alleged violations of state common law procedural rules are likely to pose
particular problems. In such cases, the state court's authority extends both to fashioning governing
rules and applying them to individual cases. It may be difficult to determine whether a court has
legitimately formulated and applied a new rule or illegitimately disregarded a rule that has governed
similar cases in the past and will continue to govern future cases. Compare Justice Black's equal
protection argument in his dissenting opinion in Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
This failure [of the trial judge to insure an unbiased grand jury] would be case in a different
light if the Washington Legislature had repealed its law or if its Supreme Court had altered
its interpretation and set out a general rule abrogating the right to have judges take affirma-
tive action to insure an unbiased grand jury. But without any change in the prior law or
any sure indication that Beck's "law" is the law of the future, the State of Washington in
convicting Beck applies special and unfair treatment to him.
Id. at 567. See supra note 42 for further discussion of Beck.
145. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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by their constructions except in extreme circumstances . . 146 Fair
play review would not require the Court to depart from this rule of bind-
ing state court interpretation of state law. Routine acceptance of argu-
ments characterizing state courts' disregard of established safeguards as
authoritatively "construing" the state procedural protection to be inap-
plicable, however, would severely limit the reach of the fair play ap-
proach. Closer review of the Court's opinions indicates sufficient
flexibility in the "rule" of federal court deference to state court interpre-
tation of state law to avoid this result.
First, the Court acknowledged in Mullaney, that there may be "ex-
treme circumstances" in which federal courts should not defer to state
court interpretations of state law. The Court noted that "[o]n rare occa-
sions the Court has re-examined a state court interpretation of state law
when it appears to be an 'obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a
federal issue.' "147 Similarly, the Court has recognized that there are in-
stances when a state court's action cannot fairly be viewed as an "inter-
pretation" of state law.4 In Douglas v. Buder,49 the Court rejected the
argument that a state judge's revocation of the petitioner's parole for fail-
ure to "report all arrests . ..without delay" when petitioner failed
promptly to report a traffic citation was merely a matter of a state court
interpreting state law. 150 The Court pointed out that "neither [the hear-
ing judge] nor the Missouri Supreme Court specifically made such a find-
ing and no prior Missouri decisional law is cited to support the
contention that a traffic citation has ever before been treated as the
equivalent of an arrest."''
146. Id. at 691.
147. Id. at 691 n. 1l (citing Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945)). Com-
pare Smolla's argument that "the existence of an entitlement is never entirely a state law question,
because that would allow states to defeat the due process clause by resorting to the device of the
"evanseent entitlement." Smolla, supra note 90, at 500.
148. Compare Smolla's argument that:
Some base requirement of fidelity to the ordinary meaning of words is essential if the due
process clause is to have any force whatsoever, for only words can vest an entitlement.
When a state supreme court disingenuously reads one of its own state's statute or regula-
tions so as to give a "now you see it, now you don't" quality to what appears to be a
straightforward entitlement, the federal courts should not follow that reading.
Smolla, supra note 90, at 500. Smolla points to the Supreme Court's decision in Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), as an example of the Court rejecting the state supreme court's
interpretation of state law. Smolla, supra note 90, at 500 n.175.
149. 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (per curiam).
150. Id. at 432.
151. Id.
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A federal court's refusal to view a state court decision as resting on an
interpretation of state law may be particularly appropriate .when a state
appellate court did not review a lower court decision or summarily af-
firmed a lower court judgment without purporting to construe a state
rule. If a state court's treatment of a rule is novel or seemingly inconsis-
tent with prior state court interpretations, the basis for rejecting the argu-
ment that the state court's decision rests on an "interpretation" of its law
is strengthened.
The Court's recent opinion in James v. Kentucky152 underscores the
flexibility in the Court's deference to state court interpretation of state
law. In James, the Court refused to view a state procedural default as
constituting independent and adequate state grounds for upholding a
criminal conviction. After reviewing the state law, the Court concluded
that the state law distinction between jury "instructions" and "admoni-
tions" upon which the state court based James' procedural default was
"not the sort of firmly established and regularly followed state practice
that can prevent the implementation of federal constitutional rights."' 153
Cases dealing with "retroactive lawmaking" also demonstrate that the
Court will examine the consistency of state court interpretations of state
law. In Bouie v. City of Columbia,'54 the Court held that due process
barred a state court from giving retroactive effect to an unforeseeable and
unsupported judicial construction of a criminal statute. The Bouie Court
reasoned that due process includes a "standard of state decisional consis-
tency." ' 5 James and Bouie indicate that federal courts can and do ex-
amine the consistency of state court interpretations of state law. If
federal courts can review state court decisions to determine whether the
152. 104 S. Ct. 1830 (1984).
153. Id. at 1835 (citing Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964)).
154. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
155. Id. at 354. Justice Brennan further stated:
The basic due process concept involved is the same as that which the Court has often
applied in holding that an unforeseeable and unsupported state-court decision on a ques-
tion of state court procedure does not constitute an adequate ground to preclude this
Court's review of a federal question. . . . This standards of state decisional consistency
applicable in judging the adequacy of a state ground are also applicable, we think, in deter-
mining whether a state court's construction of a criminal statute was so unforeseeable as to
deprive the defendant of the fair warning to which the Constitution entitles him ....
Id.
In Mullaney, the Court pointed out that it was not dealing with a case of retroactive lawmaking as
in Bouie. 421 U.S. at 690 n.10. Similarly, Justice Rehnquist, in his Whalen dissent, distinguished
Boule and thus recognized that retroactive lawmaking by state courts violates due process. 445 U.S.
at 706 n.2.
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court has engaged in retroactive lawmaking in violation of the basic due
process concept of fair notice, no obstacle impedes federal court review of
state court decisions to determine if the state court has engaged in ad hoc
lawmaking in violation of due separation of processes. Finally, as Bar-
clay and Hicks illustrate, in some cases the state has conceded that it
failed to provide an established procedural protection. 156
C. Harmless Error Analysis
One implication of fair play review that is likely to provoke federalism-
based objections is that violations of state procedural safeguards gov-
erning protected deprivations will be subject to federal, rather than state,
harmless error rules. The fair play approach provides no room for argu-
ments that due process requires states to "play by the rules" only when
their violations are "harmful" under state harmless error doctrine.' 57
Government denies due process under the fair play approach when it
violates due separation of processes by failing to provide established pro-
cedural safeguards. Thereafter, if harmless error doctrine applies, federal
harmless error rules govern the analysis. 158
Refusing to allow state harmless error analysis to "condition"' 5 9 the
"156. See supra notes 3 & 33-38 and accompanying text.
157. State harmless error rules may prove more problematic under an "entitlement" approach.
The Court could determine that state courts' application of state harmless error analysis provides
sufficient process to protect against "arbitrary" deprivations of procedural entitlements. See supra
note 46. But see Note, supra note 38, at 1053-54 (courts should apply federal, rather than state,
harmless error doctrine under "procedural entitlement" approach). Compare Justice Rehnquist's
reliance in Barclay on the Florida Supreme Court's practice of applying state harmless error analysis
to support his conclusion that the trial judge's error did not unconstitutionally infect Florida's bal-
ancing process of imposing capital punishment. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
158. This Article does not attempt to delineate the role courts should accord federal harmless
error doctrine when government has failed to play by the rules. Justice Marshall's argument in his
dissenting opinion in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), should be noted, however.
As its very terms make manifest, the Due Process Clause is first and foremost a guarantor
ofprocess. It embodies a commitment to procedural regularity independent of result ....
If prejudice becomes critical in measuring due process obligations, individual officials may
simply dispense with whatever procedures are unlikely to prove dispositive in a given case.
Id. at 764.
159. Under the "entitlement" approach, by comparison, the Court might be tempted to resurrect
Justice Rehnquist's argument from Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1976), and treat state harmless
error rules as "conditioning" procedural entitlements. In Arnett, Justice Rehnquist argued:
[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on
the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant . . . must
take the bitter with the sweet. Here the property interest which [Kennedy] had in his
employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied
the grant of that interest.
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due process obligation of fair play does not show lack of respect for these
state law rules, but reflects the established parameters governing the ap-
plicability of state and federal standards of harmlessness. As the name
implies, state harmless error analysis does not purport to "convert" er-
rors into nonerrors. Rather, state harmless error doctrine is precipitated
by an error of state law and addresses the effect of such an error under
state law. When errors of state law also constitute violations of federal
due process, there is no justification for allowing state law to determine
the effect of such federal constitutional errors.'" The Court has long
recognized that errors that violate the federal constitution must be
judged under federal harmless error standards, even though the errors
might otherwise be deemed harmless under state standards. 161
D. Responses to Fair Play
The practical effect that adoption of the proposed approach would
have upon governments' willingness to extend protections beyond those
otherwise required by the Court's existing interpretation of federal con-
stitutional guarantees is another question that merits attention. Adop-
tion of fair play review should not lead to widespread repeal of existing
protections, nor to steadfast refusal to provide additional procedural pro-
tection in the future. 162 First, there are the obvious difficulties surround-
ing repeal of existing laws. Second, if the federal courts adopt the
proposed fair play approach, states would not necessarily curtail the pro-
cedural protections they afford to their citizens. An argument that states
would curtail procedural safeguards cynically presumes that govern-
ments tailor their laws to avoid providing any protections that the federal
Id. at 154-55. Six of the Justices, however, disassociated themselves from this portion of Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett. The Court has since expressly rejected Justice Rehnquist's
Arneit argument. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 431-33 (1982); see also supra
note 45.
160. The Court's willingness to allow state procedural default rules to bar federal habeas relief
provides no support for allowing state harmless error rules to "defeat" fair play claims. To the
contrary, procedural defaults are based on defendants' failure to follow state procedural rules and
penalize rather than excuse the failures.
161. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
162. Of course, the fair play approach would not bar states from repealing or changing existing
procedural rules. See, eg., Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977) (change in procedural rules
does not violate ex post facto clause); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 591 (1884) (same).
For the argument that constitutionalizing every violation of agency regulations would result in
fewer and less protective regulations, see United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979). In
his dissent, Justice Marshall pointed to the lack of any evidence that prior decisions holding agencies
bound by their regulations had led to withdrawal of the regulations. Id. at 768.
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Constitution does not independently mandate. Experience, particularly
recent experience with state constitutions, has shown that this is not so.
Many state governments have adopted laws that provide individuals
more protection than the Federal Constitution independently
mandates. 163
Moreover, as previously indicated, the proposed approach supple-
ments existing due process review. Fair play specifies that compliance
with existing procedural safeguards is a necessary, but not a sufficient
element of "fundamental fairness." Thus, the Court may hold that due
process requires more extensive safeguards than provided under existing
law. Because "entitlement" analysis deals with the creation of threshold
interests, a government may escape due process review by eliminating or
refusing to "create" an entitlement. 16' Fair play analysis, however, ap-
plies only when a protected interest is at stake. "Fundamental fairness"
always requires a floor of procedural safeguards in these cases. This rec-
ognition, and the uncertain location of this floor under current case law,
should lessen any incentive to repeal or limit procedural protections.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its treatment of due pro-
cess claims based on violations of state procedural rules. As Barclay il-
lustrates, at times the Court has dismissed such claims as alleging "mere
errors of state law." In Hicks, however, the Court found that a state
procedural rule constituted an entitlement, which could not be arbitrarily
abrogated without violating due process. This Article proposes a new
fair play approach that demands allegiance to the rule of law as embod-
ied in the due process clauses. Specifically, it posits that due process
requires compliance with established procedural safeguards governing
deprivations of life, liberty, and property. A Supreme Court that pro-
fesses concern with "law and order" should embrace this fair play inter-
pretation of due process. As Justice Stevens recently reminded us, "[i]n a
just society those who govern, as well as those who are governed, must
163. See eg., Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951 (1982); Linde, First
Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); Developments
in the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324 (1982).
164. Cf Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 465 (1983) (Rejecting the argument that prison's proce-
dural guidelines constituted entitlement: "It would be ironic to hold that when a State embarks on
such desirable experimentation it thereby opens the door to scrutiny by the federal courts, while
States that choose not to adopt such procedural provisions entirely avoid the strictures of the Due
Process Clause.").
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obey the law." '165
165. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3430, 3457 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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